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  ABSTRACT 
 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the North American agricultural frontier moved into semi-arid 
regions of the Great Plains where farming was vulnerable to drought.  Farmers who migrated to the region 
had to adapt their crops, techniques, and farm sizes to better fit the environment.  But there was very 
incomplete information for making these adjustments, and ultimately they were insufficient: too many small, 
dry-land wheat farms were founded, only to be abandoned in the midst of drought.  Two episodes of 
homestead settlement and collapse in western Kansas in 1893-94 and in eastern Montana in 1917-21 are 
examined.  We go beyond the existing literature by explicitly detailing the weather information problem 
facing settlers and showing precisely why widespread homestead failure occurred. We present a Bayesian 
learning model to indicate how new climate information was incrementally incorporated to revise views of 
agricultural prospects.  Primary data are used to show the lagged response of homesteaders to new drought 
information and to illustrate the differential impact of drought on small farms.  Dryfarming doctrine arose as a 
solution to the problems faced by farmers in the region. Despite its optimistic claims, it was an imperfect 
response to drought. Indeed, some dryfarming practices increased the likelihood of homestead failure.  
 
“No one need be in doubt about the sharp change in climate that occurs somewhere between the 96
th 
and 100
th meridians.  It can be felt on the lips and skin, observed in the characteristic plant and animal 
life, seen in the clarity and/or dustiness of the atmosphere, determined by measurements of rainfall and 
evaporation, tested by attempts at unaided agriculture.  Practically every western traveler in the early 
years remarked the facts of aridity, though not all used the word ‘desert’..” Stegner (1954, 399) 
 
 “Dame Nature of the West holds out most alluring charms, and those who woo and win her smile reap 
a reward beyond compare.  The one thing most needed is correct and accurate information.”Buffin 
(1909, 16) 
 
“That dry-farming is a system of agricultural practice which requires the application of high skill and 
intelligence is admitted; that it is precarious is denied.  The year of drought is ordinarily the year in 


















In the midst of the tragic drought of the 1930s that was driving farmers from the land and exposing 
dry soil to wind erosion and the Dust Bowl, the Roosevelt Administration established the Great Plains 
Committee to assess prospects for the region.  The Committee was somber in its assessment (1936, 1,3, 7, 
40, 42).   It concluded that existing conditions “had merely accentuated a situation which had been long 
developing.” Homestead farms were too small to be viable and correspondingly, were too intensively 
cultivated and too focused on wheat.  The Committee recommended unprecedented measures to reduce the 
number of farms and farmers through resettlement programs and to increase farm size and diversification 
through consolidation and a shift to livestock and other crops.  Past land settlement policies were castigated 
for encouraging excessive migration to the Great Plains.   
Although the drought of the 1930s was one of the most severe and widespread of the 20th century, 
earlier droughts had also brought homestead “busts” to different parts of the Great Plains.  Through each 
episode, the number of farms gradually declined and farm sizes gradually increased. These clusters of farm 
failures were unusual in the American agricultural frontier experience, and the obvious question is why small 
dry-land homesteads were located on the Great Plains in the first place.1   
In this paper, we examine the weather information problem confronting initial homesteaders.  We 
argue that the lack of accurate information led the Great Plains to be settled too densely in farms that were 
later found to be too small, undercapitalized and insufficiently diversified to be sustainable. The subsequent 
waves of homestead busts that swept the region during severe droughts were part of the adjustment toward 
agricultural techniques, crops, and farm sizes more appropriate for a semi-arid region. 
The problems of agriculture on the Great Plains have been examined previously by economic 
historians, especially with regard to the Canadian prairies.  Norrie (1975, 1977, 1980), Lewis (1981), 
Borins (1982), and Ward (1994) analyze the timing of the Canadian wheat boom between 1880 and 1914 
and describe how climate and technology affected early prairie farming.  The importance of summer fallow 
and rapid-growing wheat varieties for extending the range of settlement is discussed.  Homesteading on the 
Great Plains in the early twentieth century also has been examined by historians, such as Gates (1977) for the 





addressed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1938), Howard (1959, 189-6), Fite (1966), and White 
(1991, 142-53).  Finally, the broader issue of adaptation to semi-arid conditions is the central theme of the 
major historical work on the Great Plains by Webb (1931), Hargreaves (1957), and Malin (1944,1947).   
Our contribution is to describe more precisely the weather information problem facing all parties in 
the settlement of the Great Plains--homesteaders, investigators for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and 
state agricultural experiment stations, local and state government officials, land developers, and railroad 
officers. We analyze primary data to determine the knowledge that existed  regarding rainfall patterns and 
appropriate agricultural methods.  We argue that during homestead settlement there was neither an analytical 
framework nor sufficient data for predicting fluctuations in precipitation or for interpreting their agricultural 
consequences.  Knowledge of the climate was primitive and the underlying mechanisms triggering droughts 
were not understood. We present a Bayesian learning model to show how new climate information was 
incrementally incorporated to modify views of the region and its opportunities for successful agriculture.2 The 
resulting adaption process was not smooth or easy. Primary data are used to show the lagged response of 
homesteaders new drought information and to illustrate the differential impact of drought on small farms.  The 
Great Plains could be either wet and lush or dry and barren, with no particular pattern.  These conditions 
presented unusual learning and adaptation challenges for all parties on the frontier in ways not fully 
appreciated in the existing literature. 
For example, consider assessments of two climate theories that were popular during different stages 
of migration to the Great Plans: “Rain follows the plow” and dryfarming doctrine. These theories were faulted 
as implausible, but if they are placed into the context of the limited climate and agricultural information at 
hand, they are understandable as responses to observed conditions.  
On the earlier Kansas frontier, homesteaders relied upon predictions of climate change and increased 
rainfall due to cultivation. Webb (1931, 375-82) labeled the notion that precipitation would rise with 
settlement as a “false hypothesis” that grew out of the intense desire of farmers for more rain. But rainfall 
initially was high as agriculture moved into the region, and observers lacked any compelling reason to deny its 
possible link to settlement. On the later Montana frontier, settlers were reassured by dryfarming doctrine that 





criticizes the dryfarming movement for making excessive claims: “that it had been promoted by a highly 
organized propaganda is the most obvious conclusion; that it has been an effort largely without guidance in 
the public interest becomes equally apparent”(1957, 23).3  As we show, however, dryfarming doctrine was 
tested during periods of (ex post) abnormal rainfall, and it too seemed a remedy for the semi-arid conditions 
of region.  
Both theories emerged at a time when the practical science of cultivation seemed to offer the means 
for bending nature to meet human needs. The drought of 1917-21 in Montana finally dashed these notions.  
We examine changes in dryfarming doctrine and assess which tenets held up and which ones had to be 
significantly modified or jettisoned. We also show that the recommended 160 to 320-acre homesteads were 
the farms most likely to fail during drought.  
 
II. Homesteading on the Great Plains and the Information Problem Facing Settlers Regarding the 
Weather. 
 
Between 1863 and 1880, the northern U.S. agricultural frontier moved across the Midwest from 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois through Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota to the eastern parts of Kansas, 
Nebraska, and the Dakotas.4  In following the frontier, migrants encountered similar climatic and growing 
conditions.  This situation allowed settlers to use familiar cultivation  
techniques, crops, and farm sizes as in their places of origin. 5 By 1880, however, much of the remaining 
government land for claiming was in the Great Plains. Between 1880 and 1925, 1,078,123 original 
homestead entries were filed to 202,298,425 acres in western Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas and 
eastern Colorado and Montana, 45 percent of all homestead filings and 48 percent of all government land 
claimed during the period.6  
  Figure 1 
When migrants crossed the 100th meridian into this region (Figure 1), they encountered climatic 
conditions that were quite different from what they had experienced in the East or in Europe.  It was dry.  





Figure 2 illustrates climatic conditions facing settlers.  It shows mean precipitation levels for three 
Midwestern states that were origins for many homesteaders–Minnesota, Illinois, and Ohio, as well as for 
western Kansas, and eastern Montana, from 1895 through 1947, a period for which we have comparable 
regional data.8 The figure shows the rainfall disparities that confronted homesteaders at their frontier 
destination.  Notice that precipitation was always higher in the Midwest, and even when it fell, it remained 
above that found in western Kansas and eastern Montana. In the Midwest, during a dry period, rainfall 
generally was sufficient for crops at lower yields. But in western Kansas and eastern Montana agriculture was 
always on the margin. When rainfall was at or above the mean, yields would be plentiful, but when rainfall 
was below the mean, yields and agricultural income would fall.  
  Figure 2 
Table 1 reports the mean precipitation levels for the three regions, the coefficient of variation, and the 
correlation coefficients between the regions.  Not only did western Kansas and eastern Montana have lower 
average precipitation than in the Midwest, but the coefficient of variation measures show that rainfall was 
more variable, making weather prediction more difficult in those states.  Further, the correlation coefficients 
indicate that the weather experience a farmer might have had in Ohio provided little useful information for 
predicting rainfall patterns in either frontier area.     
  Table 1 
Our definition of a severe drought is rainfall one standard deviation below the mean. An annual 
rainfall distribution calculated for the state of Montana over a 88-year period, 1895 to 1982, reveals that 
severe droughts, with precipitation of 13 inches or less, occurred 16 percent of the time.  Precipitation above 
the mean, with precipitation between 16 and 22 inches, was found during 40 percent of the period.  Annual 
rainfall of 20 inches or less was the threshold used by Webb (1931, 17) to define the Great Plains.  A similar 
distribution calculated for the Midwest, however, shows that even during severe droughts, annual rainfall 
never fell below 25 inches.  In the Great Plains, then, low mean precipitation, coupled with high variability, 
presented a new threat for agriculture, and drought was to take a toll.9  
The weather information problem facing migrants was especially acute because of the  climatic 





model for interpreting available information. The Great Plains are a climatic transition zone where most North 
American droughts occur.10 During periods of high precipitation, the area takes on the characteristics of the 
East and is attractive for the kinds of agriculture that take place there.11 When droughts occur, however, 
those farming practices are placed at risk since rainfall levels are far too low to sustain crops that require 
more moisture.  
Drought is a meteorological phenomenon, an extended period of below normal levels of precipitation. 
It is due to an aberration in atmospheric circulation, but the precise triggering mechanisms even today are not 
well identified or very accurately predicted.12 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries studying droughts was 
made more difficult because of very limited access to the mid and upper atmosphere, which housed the jet 
stream and other key meteorological forces affecting precipitation.  Further, there was no established 
framework for analyzing the data that were collected.13 The Weather Bureau’s Bulletin D, issued in 1897 
outlined the primitive state of knowledge about precipitation and admitted that there were few observed 
patterns regarding droughts (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau,1897, 18, 24).  Only sparse 
rainfall data for the Great Plains were available for analysis by prospective homesteaders.  Although the 
Weather Bureau collected some precipitation data for the region, the data generally were intermittent and 
incomplete for most of the 19th century. 14 Precipitation and temperature records often were collected at 
military posts, but the stations were widely scattered and temporary.  Many areas had no precipitation 
records until the 20th century.    
Until the Great Plains were settled, droughts were not of overriding concern to migrants. In the 
Midwest dry months could reduce yields and agricultural income in affected areas, but they usually did not 
mean complete crop failures. Temperatures were followed more closely because frosts were important in 
determining growing seasons.  The Army Signal Corp only began to systematically collect temperature and 
precipitation data from weather stations and voluntary reporters in 1870 with creation of the U.S. Weather 
Bureau. 15 A Division of Agricultural Meteorology to analyze weather patterns was not established 
until1916.16  
With a very imperfect understanding of the region’s climate, “folk” theories emerged regarding the 





weather of the region (Smith, 1947, 169-93; Malin, 1953, 211). The theory argued that rainfall was 
endogenous to human activity. The frequent movement of transcontinental trains was thought to change the 
flow of moisture, increasing precipitation in the plains. Planting trees also was hypothesized to make the air 
more humid with the release of oxygen and water vapor and hence, more likely to support rainfall.  But the 
most critical factor was cultivation, whereby the hard prairie soil which previously caused water to run off, 
was broken down to become more absorptive and a subsequent source of moisture for evaporation and 
following the cycle, for rainfall. 
After the Kansas drought of 1893-94, the idea that cultivation would permanently affect 
precipitation began to be dismissed. Some Weather Bureau officials concluded that the climate did not 
change perceptively due to human activity.  Irrigation proponent, F. Newell (1896, 172) argued that 
“farmers have deluded themselves with the belief that with the breaking the soil...and bringing civilization, the 
climate was becoming more favorable to their operations.” E.C. Chilcott, Chief of the Office of Dry Land 
Agriculture in the Department of Agriculture and others in the USDA rejected the argument that the climate 
was changing (Chilcott, 1908, 451; Sullivan, 1909, 289-90). There was, however, no alternative 
explanation for precipitation fluctuations, such as the relatively high levels of rainfall enjoyed in western 
Kansas in the early 1880s and in eastern Montana between 1906 and 1916.  Even as late as the1930s, a 
leading researcher of climate in the region, Warren Thornthwaite (1936, 219), concluded that there was no 
simple rainfall pattern that lent itself for effective drought predictions on the Great Plains.17    
 
III. The Kansas Homestead Bust: the First Major Homestead Failure on the High Plains. 
 
Homestead failure in Kansas illustrates how severe drought modified initial views of farming 
prospects on the central Great Plains. Eastern Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas were settled beginning 
in the late 1850s and early 1860s, largely by emigrants from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.  Rainfall and soil 
conditions were relatively similar to what they had experienced before and the settlers “felt at home”(Fite, 
1966, 13).  Farmers used the same farming techniques and grew crops of corn and small grains. The 






however, led to an exodus of homesteaders as their crops and farms failed.  This was the first major 
homestead “bust” on the Great Plains.18 
Figure 3 presents rainfall data for western Kansas, beginning in 1883.  Mean precipitation for the 
region was 24 inches, and although 1890 was a dry year, with 17 inches, 1891 and 1892 were wet with 35 
and 23 inches, respectively.  But 1893 and 1894 were very dry, with rainfall at 19.6 and 15.9 inches, and 
these were the years that brought about farm failure.  As yields collapsed, farm families migrated from the 
region.  The population of the 24 counties of Kansas that lie west of the 100th meridian fell from 68,328 in 
1890 to 50,118 in 1900, a decline of 27 percent and the number of farms declined from 14,311 in 1890 to 
8,952 in 1900, a drop of 37 percent. By contrast, eastern Kansas did not experience a drought and between 
1890 and 1900, and the number of farms and population grew by 10 percent and 19 percent, respectively.19 
  Figure 3 
By the end of the drought and the associated revision of expectations, western Kansas was less 
attractive to new homesteaders.  There were 2,385 original homestead entries in 1892, the year before the 
drought, and even more, 3,083, in 1893, the first year of the drought.  But then they fell to 907 in1894 and 
averaged only 471 new entries annually through the end of the century.20 The drought also brought 
agricultural adjustment in western Kansas through farm consolidation and diversification with combined 
livestock and grain production.  Between 1890 and 1900 average farm size in the region doubled from 221 
acres to 468 acres and rose to 504 acres by 1920.  Larger farms were better able to withstand drought.  By 
contrast, farm consolidation in eastern Kansas where rainfall was higher was  much more modest.  Average 
farm size in eastern Kansas was 169 acres in 1890, 186 acres in 1900, and 197 acres in 1920, only a 17 
percent increase between 1890 and 1920.21  
The homestead failure of western Kansas and Nebraska following the drought of 1893-94, however, 
did not deter subsequent migrants from settling on small farms in other parts of the semi-arid Great Plains, 
especially in eastern Montana and the western Dakotas between 1905 and 1920. The Kansas experience 
does not appear to have loomed large in the information set used by settlers. Most homesteaders in eastern 






communicating weather information from other regions to prospective settlers on the upper Great Plains.  
Although the USDA published bulletins on farming in the Great Plains, it does not appear to have actively 
disseminated the publications to migrants, nor did it or any other agency strongly warn of droughts.22 Indeed, 
most organizations were stressing a different factor, dryfarming doctrine, that promised to limit the impact of 
any future drought on agricultural prospects in the region.23 
 
IV. Dryfarming Doctrine or “Scientific Soil Culture” as a Progressive Era Solution to Drought:       
1900-1916. 
 
Dryfarming doctrine, or scientific soil culture, gained prominence after 1906.  The most influential 
communicator of dryfarming doctrine was Hardy Webster Campbell who published a series of monographs 
(1902, 1907, 1914, 1916). Other major dryfarming proponents had credible academic credentials and 
agricultural experience, such as John Widtsoe, President of the Utah Agricultural College and formerly head 
of the Utah Experiment Station and B.C. Buffin, Professor of Agriculture at the Universities of Wyoming and 
Colorado Agricultural College and Director of the Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station.24 Their 
recommendations to farmers were presented in a scientific manner, with discussion of the experimental 
techniques used, designation of control plots, use of precise measurement in data collection, and 
accompanied with practical testimonials.25 Their prescriptions for arid regions were repeated in agricultural 
experiment station bulletins and circulars, state and local government publications, proceedings of Dry 
Farming Congresses, and railroad immigration pamphlets.  Further, dry farming doctrine was examined in 
USDA bulletins, and an Office of Dry Land Agriculture was created in 1905. Dryfarming doctrine offered a 
remedy for drought.  With proper cultivation, soil moisture could be saved and yields could be smoothed.  
Dryfarming doctrine made failure a choice variable.26  Farmers who followed its precepts could expect to 
succeed during periods of short rainfall, whereas those who did not could expect to fail. 
Dryfarming doctrine reflected the Progressive Era’s belief in the practical use of science to advance 






techniques were so labor intensive, but promised such high yields, dryfarming also encouraged formation of 
small family farms.28This was important because the emergence of dryfarming principles coincided with 
political conflict over the size of homesteads to be allowed on federal lands. In 1878, John Wesley Powell 
had proposed allocations of 2,560 acres in semi-arid regions.  Such large allocations were controversial 
because they threatened to reduce the total number of settlers who could obtain land on the frontier.29Those 
who promoted Campbell’s dryfarming techniques strongly supported the maintenance of the small-farm 
homestead.  Dryfarming’s promises may have influenced the political debate because only minimal 
adjustments were made to federal land laws in 1909 and 1912 to allow for 320 rather than 160 acres and to 
reduce the residency requirement from 5 to 3 years.  The question subsequently encountered was whether 
such small farms of 160 or 320 acres could be viable during serious drought. 
The key element of dryfarming doctrine was the use of the soil to store water, sometimes four to ten 
feet under ground. The stored water was hypothesized to percolate upward via capillary action toward the 
surface to nourish plant roots (Campbell, 1902, 6). Water was to be captured through persistent cultivation, 
deep fall and spring plowing to capture moisture, surface mulching with a harrow after every rain to create a 
2 ½ to 3 inch mulch to retard evaporation, subsurface soil packing to promote percolation, and summer 
fallow and tillage on alternating years to build up moisture and nutrients.30 The subsurface packer and other 
specialized implements were recommended by dryfarming advocates.31 Too much evaporation, rather than 
too little rainfall was asserted to be the critical problem in semi-arid regions (Campbell, 1902, 42). Close 
attention to the principles promised mastery over the vagaries of nature: “the farmer will always have a crop: 
in the wet years his crop will be large; in the driest year it will be sufficient to sustain him” (Widtsoe, 1911, 
402). 
   Dryfarming experiments were conducted at a time when there were no serious droughts, and its 
claims were not really put to test until1917.  Lacking the perspective of long-term precipitation and farming 
data, its advocates, however, did not appreciate how dependent their conclusions were on the unusual rainfall 
of the period.    






supplying information to homesteaders on the Great Plains after the turn of the century.  Dryfarming doctrine 
molded how settlers formed expectations for agricultural success on the Great Plains and how they 
interpreted new evidence regarding changes in rainfall. 
A chief source of information was the agricultural experiment station.  The Montana Agricultural 
Experiment Station organized Farmers’ Institutes to bring together farmers and experiment station personnel. 
The Farmers’ Institute assured prospective homesteaders that even in eastern Montana where annual rainfall 
was about 13 inches, irrigation was “not necessary” in many places and that good crops could be grown 
even during dry periods by adhering to dryfarming doctrine (Montana Farmers’ Institutes (1903, 201-3).  
Besides Farmers’ Institutes, demonstration farms were set up to showcase new crops, equipment, and 
cultivation practices, and by1910,13 dry farm substations had been set up to conduct dryfarming tests in 
eastern Montana.32 
Publications of the Experiment Stations in Montana, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, 
and Colorado provided specific information to settlers about precipitation levels in various areas, crop types 
to plant, new varieties under consideration, cultivation and tillage techniques, the best timing for cultivation 
and planting in each region, results of crop rotation experiments, expected yields and costs, returns from use 
of summer fallow, and necessary farm equipment.33 The publications were optimistic in their prescriptions for 
the success of small dry-land homesteads, and they often repeated or closely followed  the principles 
advocated by Campbell, Widtsoe, Buffin, and others.34 In this literature, rainfall levels were of secondary 
importance because of the emphasis on moisture conservation through the use of dryfarming doctrine.  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture also disseminated dryfarming information, but was more hesitant 
than were the experiment stations in drawing strong conclusions about its success throughout the Great 
Plains.35 Department personnel argued that regional differences had to be considered before making broad 
recommendations, and they criticized Hardy Webster Campbell’s assertion that dryfarming techniques could 
be applied everywhere to improve yields.  Indeed, E.C. Chilcott, head of the Office of Dry Land Agriculture 
was Campbell’s chief critic (Chilcott, 1908, 1910, 1912).36 Even so, the Department did not strongly 






experiments and recommended cultivation to enhance water storage in a manner consistent with Campbell’s 
arguments.37 
Another source of information were Dry Farming Congresses.  At least ten Dry Farming Congresses 
were held between1907 and 1916 in cities throughout the Great Plains “to discuss and compare methods by 
which the great area of arid land can be profitably utilized under thorough tillage by which the natural rainfall 
can be conserved”(Dry Farming Congress, Board of Control, 1909, 3-4).38 The meetings were popular. 500 
delegates attended the third Congress in Cheyenne, February 23-25, 1909, and in 1912, the Dry Farming 
Congress was alleged to have 15,000 members.39 The assemblies were addressed by experiment station 
personnel, leading dryfarming proponents like Hardy Webster Campbell, and local politicians, such as the 
Governors of Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana. 
Prospective homesteaders on the upper Great Plains also received publications on farming prospects 
from state agencies, such as the Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry (1900-1912), later the 
Department of Agriculture and Publicity (1914-1924) and from local communities, land developers, and 
professional homestead locators.  These parties were confident of the future of agriculture in the region. They 
described the benefits of dryfarming and provided other practical information on precipitation, county 
population, land values, and spur railroad lines. 
The railroads were yet another source of weather and agricultural information for migrants. They have 
been criticized form misleading settlers with extravagant claims about homestead prospects (Hargreaves, 
1957, 224; Howard, 1959, 167-82; Toole, 1959, 233-5).  It is not accurate, however, to describe the 
railroads’ promotion of homesteading as mere propaganda.  Railroads could not have been indifferent to the 
outcome of migration. Agricultural development was necessary to promote the settlement and economic 
growth of the region. Its failure would reduce the attractiveness of the area to migrants and hence, the value 
of railroad investment. Trains, and particularly, tracks and yards were site-specific capital investments with 
few alternative uses.  The railroads had a stake in the permanent, not temporary, success of the region, and 
they had no better information about the weather or farming opportunities than did the experiment stations or 






experiments, demonstration farms and trains, and publicized its advantages.40 “Big business” too could make 
faulty decisions. 
Following the experience of the drought of 1917-21, however, dryfarming doctrine was significantly 
modified by all parties.  We have reviewed publications of the experiment stations, the USDA, the railroads, 
and the Montana state government to assess which concepts were dropped or changed based on new 
drought information.   
Dryfarming doctrine’s emphasis on moisture conservation was retained, but the strong conclusions 
that it would maintain yields even under the driest conditions were eliminated.  Dryfarming no longer was 
viewed as a  panacea, but rather as a means of improving yields during periods of reasonable rainfall 
(McKee, 1922, 37; Wilson, 1923, 73).  Many older arguments were dismissed altogether.  Deep water 
storage and capillary action were found to have no empirical basis. Deep plowing and soil packing, once 
emphasized, were not recommended.  Instead, more limited cultivation was advised to avoid wind erosion 
and excessive evaporation (McKee, 1922, 3; Wilson, 1923, 41-48; 74-81).  Summer fallow, strip cropping, 
and inter-tillage of crops became the primary methods for conserving soil moisture and raising yields 
(Seamans, 1921, 4-6; Wilson, 1923, 25, 36, 41-8, 67-9, 81).  Previously favored, small homesteads were 
not advocated, except for irrigated farms.  Where possible, irrigation was suggested as a means of protecting 
yields and supporting crops like alfalfa (Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, 1919, 35; 1920, 
20, 35; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, Northern Pacific, and Great Northern Railroads, 1924, 51; Morgan 
and Seamans, 1920, 18).  Irrigation’s reach in this dry area of few streams, however, was recognized as 
limited.  Farmers were urged to diversify to other crops beyond wheat and to livestock.  Melons and 
potatoes were no longer touted as suited for the region, and drought-resistant wheat varieties, like Kubanka 
and Marquis spring wheat and Kharkov winter wheat were given more attention (Morgan and Seamans, 
1920, 9, 13; Seamans, 1921, 21; Wilson, 1923, 41-48; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, Northern Pacific, 
and Great Northern Railroads, 1924, 31). These were major adjustments in prescriptions for successful 
agriculture in a semi-arid region, and they had important implications for farming in the upper Great Plains.  







V. Homestead Settlement and Drought on the Upper Great Plains, 1900-1925. 
 
The homestead boom in the n orthern Great Plains began gradually after 1900 with the  major 
increase in settlement occurring in 1910 and thereafter through 1921.  Figure 4 describes original homestead 
entries in Montana per 100,000 acres of available federal land during the period 1903 through 1930.41 
Original homestead entries that had averaged 3,495 between 1900 and 1909, jumped to 21,982 in 1910 
and remained well above the pre-1910 average through 1921.  After that, homesteading declined 
considerably so that in 1925 there were only 1,180 new homestead entries.  All told, between 1900 and 
1921 some 197,388 original homestead claims were filed.42 As a result the rural population of Montana grew 
from 158,775 in 1900 to 376,878 people in 1920, with the eastern counties growing from 83,762 in 1900 to 
250,330 in 1920.43 
  Figure 4 
The timing of the homestead boom was due to federal land law changes in 1909 and 1912 that 
doubled the homestead allotment and reduced the waiting period for receiving title, the gradual extension of 
railroad lines, rising wheat prices, and the extravagant yields possible on the upper Great Plains.  Wheat 
prices rose moderately from 1900 to 1914 and then doubled from their 1914 level by 1917. Wheat acreage 
expanded from 72,555 acres in 1900 to 3,621,000 acres in 1919 (Montana Department of Agriculture, 
Labor, and Industry, 1928, 125). Between 1900 and 1915 Montana wheat yields averaged 25.5 bushels per 
acre, well above the average of 15 bushels per acre possible in the Midwestern states of Ohio, Illinois, and 
Kansas.44Yields were high because soils had accumulated nutrients that had not been leached away by 
precipitation in the dry climate. Further, the period 1906 through 1916 was one of unusually abundant rainfall 
as shown in Figure 5.  The figure describes rainfall from 1895 through 1925 in eastern Montana where most 
homesteads were located.  Except for one-year droughts in years 1904 and 1910, most of the period 
through 1916 is one of precipitation well above the mean.45  






We have been unable to locate farm-level data during the peak settlement period, 1906-1916, to 
analyze what a homesteader might have expected to earn from migrating to the region prior to the drought.  
We have, however, found a sample of farms surveyed in 1921-2 by the Montana Agricultural Experiment 
Station.  The survey collected data on farm size, crop acres, production, sales, and expenses for 27 
homesteads of 320 acres or less and 97 farms larger than 320 acres in the eastern Montana counties of Hill, 
Toole, Pondera, Cascade, Carter, Teton, Liberty, and Chouteau.46 We use these survey data to approximate 
what the average homestead farm would have earned from wheat production in 1916, the year before the 
drought.   
Using mean farm size and mean wheat acres from the survey, the1916 Montana average wheat yield 
of 19.3 bushels per acre and wheat prices of $1.43, and converting1921 mean current and total expense 
estimates from the survey to1916 values, we estimated gross and net wheat income for the average 
homestead.  The exercise is shown in Table 2.   
As indicated, the mean gross wheat income for a homestead was $2,650; wheat income net of 
current expenses was $2,365; and net of total expenses was $2,225.47 Although these are only suggestive 
figures, they compare very favorably with average U.S. per farm gross income of $2,104 in 1920 or mean 
total farm receipts for the western U.S. of $2,322 in 1922.48 The sample data indicate why homesteading in 
the upper Great Plains was such an attractive prospect in the early part of the twentieth century, given the 
very high wheat yields that were possible from untapped soil.   
  Table 2 
To further examine the motivating factors for homesteading we estimated two equations  for the 
period 1895 to 1925 for Montana: 
(1) Yieldst = c1 + c2 Land Qualityt + c3 Raint, t-1 + e,  
where land quality is represented by available surveyed federal land.  Of the total federal land available for 
claiming, there were surveyed and unsurveyed lands.  Absent a time-series measure of soil quality, we 
assume that General Land Office surveyors would have surveyed the best or most productive lands first 






the supply of available high quality surveyed land declined. We included current and previous year’s rainfall 
to test for their effects on yields. 
(2) Original Homesteadst = b 1 + b 2Available Surveyed Federal Landt + b3 WheatYieldst, t-1 + 
b4Wheat Pricet,t-1 + b5Federal Law Change + e,  
 
where a dummy for changes in federal land laws to reduce the costs of acquiring land is entered beginning in 
1909.  
  Table 3 
 Table 3 provides the results of the OLS estimation. Wheat yields were strongly influenced by land 
quality as proxied and current rainfall.  The previous year’s rain had a positive, but  statistically insignificant 
impact on yields.  These findings underscore the importance of current precipitation on plant growth in a 
semi-arid region.50  
For annual original homesteads filed, changes in federal land law that reduced the occupancy 
requirement and doubled the amount of land that could be claimed to 320 acres and lagged wheat yields, 
reflecting information on expected returns from wheat farming have the expected positive signs and are 
significant at approximately the 5 percent level.  Surveyed federal lands available for homesteading and real 
wheat prices, both current and previous year’s, also encouraged new entries although at lower levels of 
significance.51 Migrants, then, were attracted to the region by the availability of government land, which after 
1909 could be claimed more easily, by knowledge of previous high wheat yields, and the price of wheat.  
 
VI. Limited Climate Information, Dryfarming Doctrine and Learning: Drought and  Homestead       
Failure.    
 
Because settlers were moving into a very different region from what they had experienced, they 
would not know the “true” conditions for agricultural prospects at the time of the migration or farming 






relative to their prior beliefs about the area.  A Bayesian decision process would involve updating prior 
assessments whenever new information about precipitation, yields, and prices appeared, leading 
homesteaders to form new posterior judgements about the true state of agricultural opportunities in the upper 
Great Plains.  Hence, settlers would begin with limited information about farming opportunities obtained from 
previous homesteaders or publications from railroads, state and local governments or other sources.  After 
migration, they would annually update their prior opinions based on their actual experiences, leading to a 
more complete judgement about farming opportunities.  
This Bayesian process has been described as adaptive learning (Cyert and DeGroot, 1989). If the 
possibility of serious drought in the region had been appreciated and the linkage between precipitation and 
farm production well understood, farmers would have reacted differently than they did.  Observations of very 
dry weather when the drought began in 1917 would have led homesteaders to modify their prior opinions, 
formed during years of relatively high rainfall, and to adjust farming practices–delaying or changing migration 
plans for prospective migrants and reducing planting by existing farmers.  Because of their size, larger farms 
would have been preferred because they could produce more, devote additional land to moisture-conserving 
fallow, and diversify into other crops and livestock that could better withstand drought.52   
But, the climate was not understood and appropriate farm practices and sizes had not been 
determined.  Dryfarming doctrine argued that annual rainfall was not essential and that small farms could be 
successful under adverse conditions.  This limited and ultimately faulty information was used in the assessment 
of weather conditions and their implications for agriculture.  
Given a high degree of uncertainty, homesteaders relied upon heuristics that heavily weighted past 
information, gained from the experiment station and from their own experience, in making judgements about 
farming prospects when they received new rainfall information. 53 We argue that the previous wet period and 
the strong claims of dryfarming doctrine led homesteaders to discount observations of dry weather and to 
place more weight on past opinions about the ability of the small farms to withstand droughts.  Discounting 
drought prospects would lead to continued migration and farming, even in the face of currently observed 






in yields because that experience would have validated the claims of dryfarming doctrine.  If a dry year, 
however, were followed by longer periods of drought and low yields, then eventually prior beliefs would be 
adjusted toward a more pessimistic view of homesteading opportunities.  Accordingly, a migration and 
farming decision rule strongly influenced by the past assertions of dryfarming doctrine would result in a lagged 
response to a serious drought.   
As Figure 5 shows, the drought of 1917-1921 stands out both for the severity of the precipitation 
shortfall and for its length.  It was certainly an unusual event for the recently-arrived population.  For five 
years, precipitation remained below average, and in 1917 and 1919 rainfall was more than one standard 
deviation below the mean.  Nothing like this had been experienced in Montana since 1895, the period in 
which historical data were available for consideration by homesteaders.  As shown in the figure, there were 
two short-term droughts in 1904 and 1910.  These had been accommodated with little hardship, and this 
experience gave confidence that new dryfarming techniques could successfully store enough water in the soil 
to carry a small farmer through a drought year.54 
Although we do not have individual homestead data to directly test the prediction of a lagged 
response to drought due to the claims of dryfarming doctrine, we have state and county-level data that are 
instructive.  The data in Figure 4 show that original homestead entries in Montana continued at their high level 
through1922. 53,366 additional new homestead entries were filed between 1917 and 1925, with most 
between 1917 and 1922. 15,197 original homestead entries were made in 1917 (more than in 1916), and 
they gradually declined, but even 1920 and 1921, the last two years of the drought, 13,235 homestead 
claims were entered.55 The number of farms in Montana grew by 7,700 between 1916 and 1920 before 
declining gradually by 1925.56 At the county level, Table 4 shows the number of farms by two size 
categories, 320-acre homesteads and farms 641 acres and larger, in Prairie County, in eastern Montana 
between 1916 and 1919.  As indicated in the table, the number of 320-acre homesteads continued to grow 
and the homestead share of total farms remained stable from 1916, the year before the drought, through 
1919.  There is no evidence of a shift to larger farms over 640 acres that subsequently were viewed in 






Rising wheat prices between 1915 and 1920 provided motivation for settlement because they offered 
some offset for the 90 percent decline in wheat yields between 1915 and 1919.  But had climate knowledge 
been more complete, the response to higher wheat prices would have been more through expanded farm 
sizes in the face of drought rather than through settlement in small farms by additional homesteaders. 
  Table 4 
Experiment station personnel also failed to anticipate the severity of the drought and urged continued 
migration to the region.  For example, in July 1917 Alfred Atkinson of the Montana Experiment Station and 
later, President of Montana State College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, warned a prospective 
homesteader that the supply of good land was dwindling.  In an August 1917 letter to another homesteader, 
Atkinson claimed that “Dry land crops are raised successfully in practically all parts of Montana....The great 
dry farming area in Montana lies in the eastern part of the state.  There is practically no place in the state 
where they do not receive sufficient rainfall in normal years to produce a crop.”And in December 1917, the 
experiment station claimed that: “ there are very few points in Montana where they cannot raise crops 
successfully.”57 The drought would continue and become even more severe, yet Atkinson examined available 
precipitation data from 1898 through 1916 and concluded that there was “a tendency for two dry years, but 
in very few cases for three dry years in succession.”58  
By 1919 the unusual duration of the drought was finally acknowledged by experiment station 
personnel, and for the first time, there was doubt about the ability of dryfarming doctrine to guarantee at least 
a moderately successful crop.  In a further shift, in 1920 the experiment station claimed that drought could be 
expected “rather frequently (Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 1920, 8; 1921, 7; 1922, 57). 
Beginning in 1920, after three years of drought and after average wheat yields had dropped to 2.7 
bushels per acre in 1919, down from 26.5 bushels in 1915, prior beliefs about the viability of small 
homesteads finally were being revised downward.   Experiment station and railroad officials, as well as 
current and prospective homesteaders, began to modify their views of the region.  Homestead abandonment 
began. Between 1919 and 1925, some 60,000 homesteaders are claimed to have left their farms, with over 






Montana became less attractive to migrants.  As shown in Figure 4, the number of new homesteads declined 
in 1921 and 1922 and fell sharply in 1923.  
The impact of the drought on farm incomes was dramatic, and it undercut the viability of small 
homesteads in particular.  The effect of drought on large and small farms is illustrated by the survey data in 
Table 2.  In rows 2 and 3, we show gross and net wheat income in 1919 at the peak of the drought for the 
average small and large farm. The figures are calculated using the wheat acreage data from the 1921 survey, 
1919 statewide mean yields of 2.7 bushels per acre, and the 1919 mean wheat price of $2.16 per bushel.  
We converted 1921 reported expenses to 1919 values.  For homesteads listed in row 2, 1919 net wheat 
income was $108, less than one-twentieth of 1916's income of $2,365.  Mean wheat income in 1919 net of 
current expenses, mortgage costs and depreciation was -$114.00.  As shown in row 3, larger farms could 
withstand the drought somewhat better. Gross wheat income was $1,213, income net of current expenses of 
$491, and income net of mortgage and depreciation costs of $ 84. The drop in yields due to the drought hurt 
farms of all sizes, but larger farms still had more than four times the net wheat income of homesteads and had 
positive earnings to service mortgage debt.60  
The experiment station and USDA literature after 1920 is uniformly critical of small homesteads as 
not being viable for agriculture in the semi-arid upper Great Plains. Experiment Station Director Linfield 
claimed that the earlier distribution of lands via the homestead acts had been a mistake and that much larger 
farms, “two to four times the area of the land named in the National Homestead Acts” were necessary for 
successful farming in dry areas (Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 1924, 8; 1926, 6).61 Smaller farms 
not only produced less, but they also had higher costs per bushel.  Using the survey data, mean 1919 current 
expenses per bushel were $1.74 and $1.29 for small and large farms, respectively, a difference of over a 
third or $.45 per bushel.62 
Although variation in land quality and human capital may have influenced the ability of some farms to 
survive the drought, we do not have data for successful and unsuccessful farms to examine their relative 
contribution. The available evidence, however, suggests that they likely played a secondary role in the 






who arrived later, land quality was generally high throughout the region (Morgan and Seamans, 1920, 2; 
Wilson, 1923, 8-11).  Further, most homesteaders appear to have had farming experience.63 Farm size was 
emphasized because when yields fell due to drought, farms of 320 acres or less could not produce enough to 
cover costs and sustain a family (Wilson, 1923, 94; Eckert and Maughan, 1939, 23).64 There were at least 
some economies of scale in grain production, and 360 acres was below the minimum efficient size for dry-
land agriculture (Wilson, 1923, 108-9; Eckert and Maughan, 1939, 15-23).  Additionally, small farmers may 
have been less likely to practice summer fallowing, which was strongly recommended for retaining moisture 
and maintaining yields.65 With limited acreage, small farms may not have been able to afford to leave much 
land in fallow.  Finally, small farms did not diversify into other crops and especially into livestock, as was 
suggested as another means of better withstanding drought (Wilson, 1923, 41, 108-9; Oakley and 
Westover, 1924, 50).66   
Data assembled by the experiment station to analyze foreclosures on farm loans also shows the 
vulnerability of small homesteads to the drop in yields that occurred with the drought.  The data are described 
in Table 5.  
  Table 5 
Of the 381 loans examined, 107 were to homesteaded farms with an average size of 291 acres. 
Most foreclosed loans were made between 1917 and 1921.  70 percent of the loans to homesteaded farms 
were foreclosed, by far the largest percentage of all farm categories.  By comparison, the 127 farms acquired 
through purchase from non-relatives with an average size of 544 acres had foreclosure rates of 28 percent, 
the next highest category. All larger farms had lower foreclosure rates.  They were less likely to default on 
loans during drought because they had more production to draw from and other products beyond wheat to 
sell.67 The entire wheat-growing region of the Midwest was hurt by the fall in wheat prices in 1921, but the 
drought in the upper Great Plains exacerbated the problem. Across the region, farm failure was most 
common among the small homesteads of eastern Montana (Rich, 1923; Renne, 1938, 20; 1939, 17).  
Survey data from later in the 1920s and early 1930s reinforce the conclusion that small homesteads 






Montana, using data for 1928-1935, found that they were undiversified and small, two-thirds were below 
360 acres, when at least 700 to 800 acres were deemed necessary for minimum cost production.68 
Cochrane’s (1938) examination of 314 farms, using data for 1934-36, found that the most productive farms 
(measured by net income) were twice the size of the average farm, at approximately 1,100 acres, focused on 
wheat cultivation with diversification into livestock production, did not invest appreciably more in buildings, 
but used more machinery, and were more likely to practice summer fallow than were their less productive 
counterparts. 
 
VII.  Conclusion. 
 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the North American agricultural frontier moved for the first 
time into semi-arid regions where farming was vulnerable to drought.  Farmers who migrated to the Great 
Plains had to adapt their crops, techniques, and farm sizes to better fit the environment.  But there was  very 
incomplete information for making these adjustments. The use of decision rules that were heavily influenced 
by first, the optimistic notion that the climate was changing, and then by the strong claims of dryfarming 
doctrine led too many to migrate to the region and settle on too many small dry land wheat farms. Our 
sample homestead data indicate that so long as rainfall and yields remained high, early homesteads were 
viable, providing farm incomes comparable to what could be earned elsewhere.  But when rainfall sharply 
declined, small farms were especially vulnerable. Many were abandoned subsequently in the midst of 
drought.   
Two waves of major homestead failures took place, first in the central Great Plains of western 
Kansas and Nebraska and eastern Colorado and then, almost 25 years later in the northern Great Plains of 
eastern Montana and the western Dakotas.  These homestead failures and corresponding farm consolidation 
were part of a necessary transition process toward larger, more viable farms in the Great Plains.  Although it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the costs of this transition, they surely included the lost 






cultivation that subsequently contributed to wind erosion and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, excessive county 
infrastructure that was designed for larger populations, and disruption to the banking system by wide-spread 
mortgage defaults by small farmers and corresponding bank failures.  
The transactions costs, however, were probably unavoidable given the limited information available 
about the climate of the Great Plains and appropriate agricultural techniques and farm sizes for a semi-arid 
region.  Had homesteaders better understood the weather they might not have accepted the claims of a 
changing climate or of dryfarming doctrine.  And h ad dryfarming tests occurred under less favorable 
circumstances, its doctrine might have been more circumspect, with less encouragement for small farmers.   
Land laws might have been revised and fewer homesteaders might have gone to the Great Plains around the 
turn of the century. 
Census data provide a glimpse of the adjustment in farm size that was necessary to bring about more 
sustainable agricultural establishments.  In 1910, during the midst of the homestead boom in the upper Great 
Plains, average farm size in eastern Montana was 612 acres, a figure that included homesteads and larger 
established farms and ranches.  By 1920, average farm size was 696 acres, and by 1925, after the effects of 
the drought had been felt and farm consolidation had occurred, average farm size was 783 acres, an increase 
of 28 percent from 1910.69 Moreover, the share of small farms, 499 acres or smaller, declined between 
1910 and 1925 from 84 percent of total farms to 59 percent, whereas the share of larger farms, 500 acres 
and up, increased from 16 percent to 41 percent. The dispersion of observed farm sizes also declined.  The 
coefficient of variation for farm sizes in eastern Montana fell from 1.35 in 1910 to 1.01 by 1925.70  Farm 
sizes continued to expand after 1925 with adoption of mechanization and associated changes in economies of 
scale in grain production.  The droughts of 1893-94 in the central region and 1917-21 in the north, however, 
dashed the small-farm ideal of the homestead acts and initiated the move to more viable, larger farms on the 
semi-arid Great Plains.   
 




               
 































































































































































Montana Original Homestead Entries per 100,000 



























































































































Mean  24.5  13.8  33.3 
Coefficient of Variation  0.21  0.19  0.10 
Correlation Coefficient with  1  0.45  0.34 
Correlation Coefficient with  0.45  1  0.34 
Correlation Coefficient with  0.34  0.34  1 




        Estimated Farm Income, 1916 and 1919 
Sample of 27 Homestead Farms, 320 Acres or Smaller 


















1916 Montana Wheat Yield 























1919 Montana Wheat Yield 























Sample of 97 Farms Larger than 320 Acres 
1919 Montana Wheat Yield 























*Total farm size included wheat acres, pasture, fallow, land in other crops, and waste. 
**Mean Expenses + Mortgage and Depreciation.  1921 expense data are converted to 1916 and 1919 values using the 













 Table 3 
Yield and Migration Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: Montana Wheat Yield 
Variable  Coefficient  t-ratios 
Constant  -6.75  -1.30 
Land Quality (Proxy)   0.93 E-03  9.58 
Montana Annual Rainfall, t  0.76  2.87 
Montana Annual Rainfall, t-1  0.24   0.96 
Durbin-Watson: 1.71     
Adjusted R-squared:  .79     
Number of Observations: 34 (1895-1929)     
Notes:  The proxy that is used for the land quality is available surveyed land in Montana (in terms of 1,000 acres) 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Original Homestead Entries in Montana  
Variable  Coefficient   t-ratio 
Constant  -24032.60  -5.20 
Available Surveyed Federal Land  0.19  0.54 
Montana Wheat Yield, t   153.81  0.78 
Montana Wheat Yield, t-1  366.24  1.94 
Price of Wheat, t  1564.71  1.13 
Price of Wheat,t-1  1850.09  1.32 
Dummy (Law change of 1909)  11680.06  4.70 
Durbin-Watson:  1.41    
Adjusted R-squared:  .61    
Number of Observations: 34 (1895-1929)    
Notes: Montana wheat yields relative to the annual wheat yields in Ohio give similar results. Total available federal land is in terms 
of 1,000 acres.  Real wheat prices are calculated using nominal prices and the consumer price index (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1976, Historical Statistics, 211). 





Farms by Size Category, Prairie County Montana 
 
Year 




Number of Farms 
Above 640 Acres 
1916  933  292  106 
Percent of Total    31%  12% 
1917  1079  357  155 
Percent of Total    33%  14% 
1918  1384  481  191 
Percent of Total    33%  14 
1919  1563  522  198 
Percent of Total    33%  13% 
Source: Prairie County Tax Records, Montana Historical Society, Helena  
       
Table 5 








of Loan  Farm Appraisal 
Farm Size 
(Acres) 
Homestead  107  70%  $2,023  $5,636  291 
Purchase from 
Non-Relatives  127  28  5,621  14,522  544 
Purchase from 
Relatives  32  22  6,753  16,709  788 
Homestead and 
Purchase  82  27  5,741  15,894  826 
Other  33  24  7,079  21,100  1,102 
Source: Montana State Experiment Station, Bozeman, Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana State 
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  Endnotes 
 
                                                                   
1.  For analysis of some American frontier experiences and the comparative ease of frontier farming, Danhof (1969), Ferrie 
(1994), and Galenson and Pope (1989). 
2.  For discussion of decision making under uncertainty, the use of heuristics, and the biases that can result, see 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), El-Gamal and Grether (1995), and Camerer (1995). 
3.  Hargreaves (1957) provides a very broad and complete study of agriculture in the upper Great Plains, and we have 
benefited from her analysis. See also, Hargreaves (1958, 1977). Although she recognizes the information problem facing 
settlers, she labels the spread of dryfarming doctrine as “propaganda,” less concerned with the spread of viable farm 
practices and more concerned with development. See, for example, 1957, pages 33, 78, 83, 97, 121, 125, 220, 223, 234, 238, 
328.   We interpret dryfarming doctrine differently, based on our analysis of experiment station studies and precipitation 
levels during the major homestead period.  As we show later in the text, there were two one-year droughts between 1904 
and 1910.  The rest of the period was the wettest in the 20
th century, a perspective that no party had at that time.  




                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
farms when the long-term drought set in after 1916.  As we view it, all of the parties involved in development, 
homesteaders, real estate agents, railroad officers, dryfarming movement leaders, experiment station investigators, and 
state and local government officials, had a stake in successful long-term agricultural settlement. 
4.  Between 1863, the year after the Homestead Act was passed, and 1880, 469,882 original  homestead entries were filed 
covering 55,667,035 acres of federal government land (Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office).  
The average claim size was 118 acres. 59 percent of the claimed acreage was in the Midwest, in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, eastern Kansas and Nebraska. 
5.  For instance, 1880 census data show similar agricultural patterns across northern states: Average farm size was 99 
acres in Ohio, 124 acres in Illinois, and 134 acres in Iowa; Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa devoted 13 percent, 29 percent, and 27 
percent of farm land to corn and 10 percent, 10 percent, and 6 percent, respectively, in wheat.  See U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Census Office (1883, 26-7, 102-3, 177, 212, 250-1). Farmers did have to make adjustments for different temperatures 
and soil types.   Olmstead and Rhode (2000) examine the process of biological innovation that occurred in American 
agricultural development that was in part stimulated by migration to new areas with different growing conditions.  
6. Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office for the Fiscal Years, 1880-1925. The calculations are for 
state totals. 
7. Ranges of mean annual precipitation, calculated 1941-1970 for western Kansas are provided in Self (1978, 58). 
8. National Climatic Data Center (1983) for Minnesota, Illinois and Ohio.  Eastern Montana precipitation data through 1913 
from Burke and Pinckney (1914) and for 1914-47 from USDA Weather Bureau, “Summary of the Climatological Data for the 
United States by Section, published annually.  Our classification of eastern Montana follows that used by Hargreaves 
(1957).  Western Kansas data from a website: cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/r3d/ushcn/state/KS.  These data are for stations in the 
western 24 counties.  Stations were identified from NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, Asheville, 1983, “Climatological 
Data Annual Summary, Kansas” Vol 97 (13), map, p. 34.  
9.  For an assessment of the critical importance of precipitation on the Great Plains, see Starch (1939, 114).  When rainfall 
occurred also was critical.  Rainfall during the growing season, April-June, was most important.  For discussion, see Burke 
and Pinckney (1919). 
10.  Bark (1978, 11), Riefler (1978, 66), Diaz (1983), Karl and Koscielny (1982). 
11. Warrick (1975, 11-27; 1980) points out that although there is no general agreement on how normal circulation patterns 
are disrupted to cause droughts, the arid Southwest and Great Plains are most susceptible in North America.  There are no 
well-defined drought cycles. Smith (1920b, 81-2, 101) provides an early discussion of the climate of the Great Plains, giving 
charts of climate types according to annual rainfall and charts of crops.   
12.  Felch (1978, 25-42). The American Meteorology Society defines drought as a period of abnormally dry weather 
sufficiently prolonged for a lack of water to cause serious hydro-logic imbalance in the affected area. See also, Schneider 
(1978, 163), Warrick (1975, xiii, 3-11), Bradley (1976, 2-15), and Trewartha (1961, 259-61, 279-87) for discussion of drought. 
Smith (1920b, 25) indicates that the study of weather was still relatively new early in the twentieth century.  
13.  See Abbe (1908, 1909) for discussion of the state of meteorological science at the turn of the 20
th century.  
14.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau (1897, 18-19) noted that “the local distribution of rainfall is 
exceedingly erratic,” so that individual registers “often afford doubtful and conflicting information respecting the yearly 
fall of one and the same region.” A few stations had longer term data.  See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin C, 
(1894) for data on annual precipitation, beginning with the earliest records, in the U.S. at various cities. Riefler (1978, 63-




                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
sparse. 
15.  Smith (1920a,  281), Whitnah (1961, 4-8) describes early crude mapping of storm movement, theories of wind and 
pressure formation in the 1840s-70s. The location of weather reporting stations is shown in the Annual Reports of the 
Chief Signal Officer through 1890.  For example see map and lists in The Report of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, 
(U.S. Department of War, Chief Signal Officer, 1881, 304).  The reports also provide summaries of the year’s weather at 
observation posts. See also, Hughes (1970, 36-9). Craft (1998) provides discussion of the use of weather information in 
Great Lakes shipping. 
16.  Smith (1920a, 281); Weber (1922, 7-12) describes early weather activities in the 1870-80s that included limited 
forecasts, river observations, flood warnings, and some meteorological investigation.  
17. Ausubel and Biswas (1980, 93-123) discuss the impact of droughts on agricultural yields. 
18.  Fite (1966, 126-131), Self (1978, 58), Baltensperger (1977), and Riney-Kehrberg (1989).   Stegner (1954, 296) argues that 
drought conditions began to appear in 1886.  Rainfall data, however, indicate a series of one-year droughts in the 1880s 
with rebounds in precipitation.  The 1893-94 drought was not only deeper but lasted longer. 
19. 21 of the 24 counties lost population.  Calculated from U.S. Agricultural and Population Censuses 1890, 1900. See also 
Fite (1966, 131).  
20.  Homestead entries are for the entire state of Kansas, but most settlement was in western Kansas.  The average is for 
1895-1899. Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. 
21.  Calculated from U.S. Agricultural Census, 1880, “Report on the Production of Agriculture,” 115-6; 1890, “Report on 
the Statistics of Agriculture,” 209-9; 1920, Vol. 6, Pt. 1, 732-41. Western Kansas counties are those west of the 100
th 
meridian and eastern Kansas counties were those to the east.  Discussion of drought adaptation in Kansas is in Fite 
(1966, 131-4), Saarinen (1966), and Malin (1944). 
22.  There was an unsuccessful effort to persuade Chilcott and other USDA staff members to be more active in the Dry 
Farming Congresses.  See exchanges involving F.B. Linfield and Alfred Atkinson of the Montana Agricultural Experiment 
Station and E.C. Chilcott and other USDA officials during 1910 and 1911 regarding USDA involvement in the congresses 
and in disseminating USDA publications and views.  Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana State University, 
00004, Box 3, Files AA-F6, AC-F4, AF-F4, AF-F4A, AF-F4B, AF-F5. 
 
23. This “failure” to learn from the Kansas experience has been criticized by observers who have commented on the 
riskiness of agriculture in the Great Plains. For example, see Johnson (1901), Thronthwaite (1936), Great Plains Committee 
(1936), and Warrick (1980).  There also was no sharing of weather information between ranchers and Native Americans 
who had lived in the region for some time and prospective homesteaders.  Ranchers and Native Americans, however, had 
different experiences. They used very large tracts of land either to graze animals or to follow and hunt them, and hence, 
did not face the same constraints that subsequently confronted small homesteaders.  
24.  Other advocates included E.R. Parsons, (1913), who was credited with 40 years of experience and scientific training; 
Thomas Shaw (1911), Professor of Animal Husbandry at the University of Minnesota; V.T. Cooke (1907), whose work was 
published by the Wyoming Dry Farming Commission, and Professor Murray E. King (1911).   For discussion of other 
dryfarming adaptations, see Merk (1978, 484-94). 
25.  For example, see discussion of control plots and other experiments in Campbell (1914, 20-24; 1916, 25-7). 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
27.  Widtsoe (1911, 361).  Notice also, Buffin (1911, 11-2): “Evolution always leads towards greater perfection.”See 
Sullivan (1928, 6105), Noble (1958, 5-6), Hays (1959, 265-6; 1995, 15-8), Diner (1998, 3-4) for discussion of the ideology of 
the Progressive Age and the optimistic assessments of the role of science and technology for human progress. 
28. There was a considerable bias toward small homestead farms in the dryfarming doctrine literature because they offered 
an alternative to more costly irrigation or larger-scale ranching.  Larger farms were also considered wasteful. See Campbell 
(1902, 5; 1907, 1914, 1916) and Buffin (1909, 36). 
29.  See Stegner (1953,* 219-42) and Pfeffer (1951, 8-62, 135-68) regarding the political controversy over homestead farm 
size and efforts to adjust the federal land laws. 
30.  Parsons (1913, 17, 44), Campbell (1902, 34; 1914, 57-65). 
31.  Campbell (1902, 12-5), Widtsoe (1911, 301), Buffin (1909, 35-7).  
32.  The actions of the county agents and the experiment stations in disseminating dryfarming doctrine are described in 
Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana State University, 00004, Box 1,AA-F8, 00002, Box 22, File T-10, and 
collection 78036.  
33. For example, Linfield and Atkinson (1907) identified the Montana regions, some 12 to 14 million acres where 
dryfarming promised the greatest success, and  Atkinson and Nelson (1908), described viable grain types and cultivation 
practices and concluded that dry farming would be successful in many parts of Montana. Climatic information for 
Montana stations through 1913 was listed by Cooley (1912) and Linfield (1914). Other experiment station publications that 
outlined dryfarming techniques include Cooley (1907), Atkinson and Cooley (1910), Atkinson and Wilson (1915), and 
Atkinson (1915).  
34.  To illustrate, see the correspondence between Agricultural Experiment Station personnel and prospective 
homesteaders in the Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana State University, 00004, Box 1, File AC-F4.  In one 
letter to B.D. Bundy from Alfred Atkinson of the experiment station, May 30, 1916, Atkinson asserted that 160 acres could 
give fine returns.   
35.  For example, see Chilcott, Cole, and Burns (1915). 
36.  However, Hargreaves (1948) concludes that the differences between Chilcott and dryfarming promoters were more of 
degree than of substance. 
37.  For example, in a USDA bulletin, Failyer (1906) makes arguments very similar to those outlined by Campbell. 
38. They met in Denver, 1907, Salt Lake City, 1908, Cheyenne, 1909, Billings, 1909, Spokane, 1910, Colorado Springs, 1911, 
Lethbridge, 1912, Wichita, 1914, Denver,1915, and El Paso, 1916. 
39. Quisenberry (1977, 220) claimed that 20,000 attended the 1912 Dry Farming Congress in Lethbridge.  Other sources 
claim that the Dry Farming Congress had 15,000 members at the time  (Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana 
State University, 00004, Box 3, File AF-F4A).  
40. The Northern Pacific Railroad echoed the claims of drying farming doctrine in its pamphlet (1911), “Western North 
Dakota: Being a Description of a Land of Great Promise and the Opportunities it Holds for Homeseekers,” Montana 
Historical Society Collections.  For additional discussion on the role of the railroads in the region, see Overton (1965, 283-
85) and Scott (1985, 35). 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
of the declining federal estate. Original homestead claims and total federal land available for claiming are compiled from 
the Annual Report of the General Land Office for the years of 1903-1930. 
42.  Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.  
43. 1900 and 1920 U.S. Population Census. 
44.  Yields are from the USDA Yearbook of Agriculture, 1900, 769; 1910, 516-7;1920, 565-6; 1925, 746; 1930, 600-1. Mean 
yields between 1900 and 1915 were 15.39 bushels per acre for Ohio, 15.63 bushels for Illinois, and 14.15 for Kansas.  
45.  Rainfall data compiled from Burke and Pinckney (1914) and USDA, Weather Bureau, “Summary of the Climatological 
Data for the United States, by sections, Montana,” various years. Eastern Montana counties included follow the 
designation used by Hargreaves (1957), Big Horn, Blaine, Carbon, Carter, Cascade, Chouteau, Custer, Daniels, Dawson, 
Fallon, Fergus, Garfield, Golden Valley, Hill, Judith Basin, Liberty, McCone, Meagher, Musselshell, Park, Petroleum, 
Phillips, Pondera, Powder River, Prairie, Richland, Roosevelt, Rosebud, Sheridan, Stillwater, Sweet Grass, Teton, Toole, 
Treasure, Valley, Wheatland, Wibaux, Yellowstone. 
46.  Farm Survey Records, 73039, Box 12, Files A-28, T-27, T-42, T-43, T-89, Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, 
Montana State University, Bozeman. The “Farm Survey Record” for each farm included county; date; operator; address; 
acres--owned, operated, in crops, fallow, pasture, in various types of crops; crop sales; livestock; livestock sales; 
livestock product sales; other sources of income; seed; current expenses– for hired labor, machinery repairs, seeds, 
fertilizers, taxes, and horseshoeing, and other miscellaneous costs; machinery and equipment (number, type, value); 
depreciation rates on machinery; real estate; farm finance; unpaid labor; and demographic data.  We did not include the 
farms surveyed in Yellowstone County.  These were small irrigated farms, not the dry-land farms of concern to us. 
47.  Current expense reported in the table is that described in the survey.  Total expense includes current expenses plus 
depreciation on machinery and buildings and the interest cost on mortgages and short term loans.  The survey reported 
the value of machinery and buildings, mortgage and other loans,  loan interest rates, and depreciation rates. Since some 
farmers did not report depreciation rates, we used the mean rates for them, which were 7 percent for buildings and 10 
percent for machinery. The table reports only wheat sales revenues using reported wheat acreage, 1916 Montana yields 
(USDA, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1920, 555-6), and wheat prices (U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics, 1976, 
208). 
48.  The average U.S. farm income figure for 1920 was calculated by using 1920 gross farm income as reported in the 
USDA, Agricultural Statistics (1936, 338-39) $13,566,000,000 and total number of farms in 1920 of 6,448,343 (USDA, 1922 
Agricultural Yearbook, “Agricultural Statistics,” 1923, 1008).  The 1922 USDA Agricultural Yearbook, “Agricultural 
Statistics” (1923, 1160) report $2,322 as gross receipts for western farms.  
49.  As we have indicated, soil quality in the upper Great Plains was generally high (Hargreaves, 1957, 6; Wilson, 1923, 8-
10).  Land in Montana was classified into quality categories by L.F. Gieseker.  We did not use this classification in the 
regression.  The data are not in time series form. 



















Montana Annual Rainfall  15.77  2.39  10.88  21.12 
 
51. We converted nominal wheat prices to real prices using the CPI index (1967 base year) from U.S. Department of 














   









Montana Wheat Yield  20.89  7.35  2.7  32.5 
Real Price of Wheat  2.91  0.81  1.82  5.34 
   
52. The advantages of larger farms became a dominant theme of the experiment station literature after the drought of 1917-
21.  See, for example, Seamans (1921), Wilson (1923), and Clawson, Saunderson, and Johnson (1940).  
53.  See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982, 11) for discussion of the “availability” heuristic.  Basically, individuals 
assess the probability of an event by the ease in which previous instances can be brought to mind. Past experiences or 
information are relied upon in decision making, especially if they have credibility.  El-Gamal and Grether (1995) also 
discuss undue reliance on past information as “conservatism”whereby decision makers require more evidence to update 
their priors than the Bayesian rule would imply.  
54.  For instance, see claim by Lewis Cameron, Sr., Martingsdale, Montana August 20, 1910, quoted in Chicago, 
Milwaukee and Puget Sound Railroad pamphlet, “The Musselshell Country,” Montana Historical Society, Helena.  See 
also,  “An Address by Howard Elliott, President of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, Delivered at the Interstate Fair, 
Bozeman, September 1, 1910" Montana Historical Society, Helena.   
55. Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. 
56.  Http://www.nass.gov/mt/historic/general/farmnumber.htm.  The numbers do not correspond with those for original 
homesteads. Some new homesteads were combined with existing farms. Moreover, as new homesteads were being 
entered, farms were being abandoned by 1919.  The number of farms rose from 50,000 in 1916 to 57,700 in 1920, declining 
gradually to 50,000 once again in 1925.   
57.  Letters by Alfred Atkinson to Gibson McKneight, July 9, 1917; Atkinson to J.L. Ambrose, August 21, 1917, both in 
00004, Box 1, File AF-F0.  Letter to B.H. Hibbard, December 4, 1917, 00004 Box 1, File AB-F1, Merrill G. Burlingame Special 
Collections, Montana State University. 
58.  Alfred Atkinson, “The Agricultural Outlook,” 00004, Box 1, File AB-F1, Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, 
Montana State University. 
59.  Toole (1959, 238), Howard (1959, 207-8) Fulton (1977).  
60. 1919 Montana yields from USDA, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1920, 555-6) and wheat prices (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Historical Statistics, 1976, 208).  In related work, we are attempting to determine the characteristics of farms 
that survived versus those that failed. 
61.  The problem of small farms remained on the Great Plains. After the droughts of the 1930s, Clawson, Saunderson, and 
Johnson (1940, 41-7) argued that there were too many small farms of 320 acres or less and they called for the number of 
farms to be cut in half.    
 
62.  These production cost differences under state the likely true difference between surviving large farms and failing 
small ones.  The 1921-22 survey necessarily included only farms, large and small, that survived the drought. 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
prior to homesteading, with other occupations related to farming (laborer, ranch hand, rancher, sheep herder) accounting 
for 30 more.  78 were listed as unclassified, and he states that the total number of prior occupations other than farming 
was 63.  
64.  Eckert and Maughan (1939, 23) concluded that farm size was the single most important factor in obtaining satisfactory 
income.  
65.  Wilson (1923, 39) points out that successful farms were more apt to use summer fallow.   
66. For further analysis of the relative disadvantage of small farms during this period see Starch (1935), Renne (1938, 1939), 
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station (1939), and Clawson, Saunderson, and Johnson (1940). 
67.  Data on relation of farm operator’s method of acquirement of farm to foreclosure, Montana State Experiment Station, 
Bozeman, Merrill G. Burlingame Special Collections, Montana State University, 73039, Box 12. See discussion in Eckert 
and Maughan (1939).  
68.  Halcrow (1938) defined unsuccessful farms as those with less than $1,000 average annual gross farm income and 
whose operators received relief assistance from the Farm Security Administration.  He also found that unsuccessful farms 
were on less productive soil, and used less summer fallow than did other farms in the area. 
69.  Data from 13
th U.S. Census, 1910, Volume VI Agriculture, 958-60, and 15
th Census of the U.S., 1930, Agriculture, 
Volume II, Part 3, 118-22.  We included the counties listed in footnote 111, which are the counties identified by Hargreaves 
as eastern Montana.  Average farm size is the mean of the average farm sizes by county. 
70.  Data are from 13
th U.S. Census, 1910, Volume VI Agriculture, 958-60; 14
th U.S. Census, Agriculture, Volume IV Part 3, 
The Western States, 106-110; and the 1925 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Part III, The Western States, 82-89.  The farm size 
categories listed in the census were combined to 0-99, 100-259, 260-499, 500-999, 1,000-4,999, and 5,000 and larger.  To 
calculate the coefficient of variation, the number of farms in each size category was assumed to have the mid point size.  A 
weighted mean was calculated and a standard deviation around the mean for 1910, 1920, and 1925. 